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Book Reviews: POLITICAL THEORY March 1994 
Political Discourse in Early Modem Britain. Edited by 
Nicholas Phillipson and Quentin Skinner. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993. 444p. $59.95. 
This is a festschrift for the indefatigable J. G. A. Pocock 
(indefatigable indeed: the volume closes with a daunting 
nine-page bibliography of Pococks work to date, a 
veritable flood of erudition that shows no signs of 
ebbing). The essays are better than what usually end up 
stuck in such volumes: better as a simple matter of 
scholarly quality, but better too as exemplary models of 
what is distinctive in Pocock's approach. I suppose that 
at this price, no one will consider asking impoverished 
graduate students to purchase the volume. But there are 
always reserve desks, not to mention xerox machines 
and copyright violation. 
The finicky among us might want to insist on several 
distinctions between Pocock's conception of the history 
of political thought and that of what is sometimes 
labelled the Cambridge school, associated especially 
with Quentin Skinner and John Dunn. Any such dis- 
tinctions are generously elided here. The history of 
political thought, we are instructed, is centrally a history 
of discourse, a labor-intensive study of how particular 
languages of politics, or conceptual frameworks, are 
shaped and reshaped by successive writers. Pocock and 
his followers have wanted to abandon the struggle of 
titans, the dubious spectacle sometimes exhibited to 
hapless undergraduates in which Plato and Hobbes, 
Locke and Marx take their crack at a set of putatively 
timeless questions. They want instead a more genuinely 
historical history of political thought, in which chronol- 
ogy matters, questions change, and dozens of desper- 
ately obscure pamphleteers appear right alongside-and 
sometimes instead of-the honored dead. 
So this is not scholarship to be produced by theorists 
who want to cozy up with their favorite text for a year or 
two and write an internal textual commentary on it. 
Here, for instance, J. H. Burns writes about "George 
Buchanan and the anti-monarchomachs"; Michael Men- 
dle comments in passing that "Some elements of Henry 
Parker's thought . . . are reminiscent of Johannes Al- 
thusius's populist reversal of Bodinian absolutism" (p. 
110); and Richard Tuck refers to Henry Hammond, 
Matthew Wren, Thomas White, Pierre Charron, Denis 
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Petau, Henry Holden, John Sargent, Kenelm Digby, and 
more. It is sobering to realize how very few theorists, 
even those describing themselves as working on early 
modern Britain, will have a clue what such titles and 
comments and references refer to. Here too we find 
some remarkable-some will say alarming-recontextu- 
alizations. Quentin Skinner situates Hobbes's Leviathan 
in the context of a Latin dispute about rhetoric, unearth- 
ing an elaborate conceptual inheritance underlying Hob- 
bes's own sizzling rhetoric and his notorious diffidence 
about his own eloquence. 
Skeptics will think that this is not even scholarship to 
be consumed by those without reasonably extensive his- 
torical learning of their own, that the density of refer- 
ences to arcane sources is high enough to make any 
underlying arguments opaque. Maybe, though I suspect 
that is just special pleading for the lazy. Whatever else 
one might say about it, Pocock's concluding essay, a 
critical review of the preceding essays, offers a perfectly 
straightforward vision of the period, one in which the 
concept of sovereignty and all its vicissitudes are front 
and center. 
Indeed, for all its contributions, the real problem with 
this sort of scholarship seems to me to lie in precisely the 
opposite direction. It needs to become more extensively 
historical, not less: that is, to pull in more sustained 
accounts of social and political change, instead of brief 
stage-setting references that get the contested discourses 
up and running. Pocock describes the enterprise as "the 
exploration of Anglo-British history as presented in its 
political literature and the history of its political dis- 
course" (p. 377). But surely, then, we need to be 
interested in the possibility that that discourse is 
opaque, confused, meretricious, shot through with pre- 
texts and sinister interests, ideologically loaded in offer- 
ing too complacent a vision of political possibilities and 
problems, happily oblivious to what seem on reflection 
the most pressing political developments of the day, and 
so on. 
Or again: the very thought of writing a history of 
discourse depends, for all of Pocock's antimarxism, on 
the cogency of some deep distinction between the ideal 
and the material. In this light, it is not surprising that 
Pocock would refer to the "intellectual and material 
forces" (p. 428) transforming England after the French 
Revolution. But if we take seriously the claim that 
society is partly constituted by concepts and categories, 
any such distinction is confounding or worse. For then, 
as Pocock has sometimes recognized, social change is 
always already conceptual change-and vice versa. 
(Well, not always: think about demographic shifts or 
currency inflation.) And then we can sharpen the senses 
in which all those pamphleteers are creative agents 
engaged in political struggle-and victims along for the 
ride in large-scale social changes intended by nobody. 
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